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FIXING RULE 702:  THE PCAST REPORT 
AND STEPS TO ENSURE THE RELIABILITY 
OF FORENSIC FEATURE-COMPARISON 
METHODS IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS 
Eric S. Lander* 
INTRODUCTION 
Within the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 marks the crossroads of 
law and science.  For the most part, courts hear testimony about ordinary 
factual matters, which the triers of fact can evaluate based on common 
knowledge and experience (e.g., “the attacker had light brown hair”).  But, 
the law recognizes that its search for truth may sometimes be aided by hearing 
the conclusions of experts with specialized scientific knowledge (e.g., “the 
hair found at the scene of the crime was microscopically indistinguishable 
from the defendant’s hair with respect to seven specific parameters, and 
scientific studies show that this degree of similarity would be seen for only 
roughly 1 person in 10,000 in the population”). 
There is an obvious risk in permitting testimony from witnesses who come 
cloaked in the mantle of scientific authority, purporting to possess powerful 
knowledge that lies beyond the ken of ordinary people.  Few jurors are 
equipped to assess the basis of an expert’s reasoning—and cross-examination 
is a blunt instrument for probing complex scientific claims.  As a result, 
expert conclusions must often be taken at face value.  When the conclusions 
are wrong, they may be highly prejudicial, outweighing other evidence or the 
lack thereof. 
 Rule 702 therefore seeks to impose a strict limitation on the admissibility 
of expert testimony.  Courts may not simply allow expert testimony that 
might be relevant and “let the jury decide.”  Instead, Rule 702 provides that 
judges may permit expert testimony only if they find that “the testimony is 
the product of reliable principles and methods” and “the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”1 
 
*  President and Founding Director, Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard.  Former Co-Chair, 
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology.  This Article was prepared for 
the Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, held on October 27, 
2017, at Boston College School of Law.  The Symposium took place under the sponsorship of 
the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules.  For an overview of the 
Symposium, see Daniel J. Capra, Foreword:  Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, 
Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1459 (2018). 
 
 1. FED. R. EVID. 702(c)–(d). 
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In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that Rule 702 requires courts to serve as “gatekeepers” who must 
assess the underlying “reliability” of proffered expert testimony.  While 
recognizing that the inquiry should be “flexible” (that is, tailored to the type 
of scientific knowledge being proffered), the meaning of “reliability” must 
be based on actual “scientific validity”:  the trial judge must determine 
“whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid”;3 “[i]n a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary 
reliability will be based on scientific validity”;4 and the “overarching subject 
[of a judge’s inquiry under Rule 702] is the scientific validity—and thus the 
evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a 
proposed submission.”5  Rule 702 (as well as cognate rules in many states) 
thus necessitates a dialog between law and science. 
Many commentators agree that, in civil litigation, Rule 702 has largely 
fulfilled the intended goal.  By preventing juries from hearing evidence that 
purports to be scientific but does not actually rest on scientifically valid 
methods, it has acted as a quality-control filter. 
In contrast, Rule 702 has largely failed in criminal law—even though 
quality control should be more important when depriving individuals of 
liberty than of money.6  Various explanations have been suggested for the 
failure, including that the vast majority of forensic science laboratories serve 
only one side, the prosecution; most defendants lack the resources to mount 
serious challenges; and judges are reluctant to question practices that have 
long been used and admitted in court.  Whatever the reasons, it is clear that 
courts have historically admitted—and continue today to admit—some 
forensic-science methods that fail to meet the most basic requirements of 
scientific validity.7 
The risks are not merely hypothetical.  Starting in the 1990s, DNA analysis 
revealed that many individuals convicted of crimes were irrefutably 
innocent.8  These discoveries have led so far to hundreds of exonerations, 
including of inmates on death row or who had spent decades in prison.9  The 
true number of wrongful convictions must be considerably larger since 
evidence that could prove innocence is only rarely available and preserved. 
Roughly half of these cases involved forensic-science evidence that was 
faulty—sometimes egregiously so.  The problem could not simply be blamed 
 
 2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 3. Id. at 592–93. 
 4. Id. at 591 n.9. 
 5. Id. at 594–95. 
 6. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1071 (2003). 
 7. See generally id. 
 8. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS:  ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF 
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 44 n.94 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R76Y-7VU]. 
 9. Id. 
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on a few “bad apples” among forensic examiners.  Rather, the failure was 
systemic in that some of the supposedly scientific methods had never been 
shown to be scientifically valid. 
In 2005, Congress mandated that the National Research Council (NRC), 
the research arm of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, undertake the 
first serious study of forensic science.  Published in early 2009, the NRC’s 
report found disturbing problems across many commonly used forensic 
methods, including a lack of rigorous and appropriate studies establishing 
their scientific validity.10  In a scathing assessment, it found that “much 
forensic evidence—including, for example, bite marks, firearm, and toolmark 
identifications—is introduced in criminal trials without any meaningful 
scientific validation, determination of error rates, or reliability testing to 
explain the limits of the discipline.”11 
The NRC report made various recommendations, of which the most 
important was the establishment of a federal agency to promote the 
development of forensic science into a “mature field.”12  The report urged 
that the agency have “a culture that is strongly rooted in science” and “must 
not be part of a law enforcement agency,” owing to the inherent conflict of 
interest between proponents and evaluators of forensic methods.13 
The report triggered consternation among some in the forensic-science and 
law enforcement communities.  While some forensic scientists sought to 
remedy the lack of evidence of scientific validity, many others disputed the 
NRC’s assessment.  For their part, prosecutors argued strenuously that, while 
the NRC report had identified room for improvement, its findings should 
have no bearing on the admissibility of commonly used forensic-science 
methods.14 
The Obama administration responded to the report in several ways.  While 
bowing to opposition by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) against 
creating a forensic-science agency not tied to law enforcement, the 
administration took three actions.  First, it increased overall funding for 
forensic-science research.  Second, the DOJ, in collaboration with the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), established the 
National Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS) to provide the Attorney 
General with guidance and policy recommendations on forensic science.15  
 
 10. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  A PATH FORWARD (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLW3-Y6VQ]. 
 11. Id. at 107–08 (footnotes omitted). 
 12. Id. at 81. 
 13. Id. at 80. 
 14. See generally Simon A. Cole & Gary Edmond, Science Without Precedent:  The 
Impact of the National Research Council Report on the Admissibility and Use of Forensic 
Science Evidence in the United States, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 585 (2015); Paul C. 
Giannelli, The 2009 NAS Forensic Science Report:  A Literature Review, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 
378 (2012). 
 15. National Commission on Forensic Science, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs [https://perma.cc/Z8C9-3QQ4] (last visited Feb. 14. 
2018). 
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Finally, the President tasked his President’s Council of Advisors on Science 
and Technology (PCAST) to recommend additional actions that the federal 
government could take to ensure the scientific reliability of forensic evidence 
used in the nation’s legal system. 
PCAST is the leading scientific and technological advisory body to the 
executive branch, originally chartered by President Eisenhower in the weeks 
after the launch of Sputnik.16  Together with White House science advisor 
John Holdren, I cochaired the council from 2009 to 2017.  During this time, 
PCAST prepared thirty-nine reports (including two classified reports) 
making recommendations to the federal government on topics including 
cybersecurity, biological weapons, nanotechnology, spectrum policy, climate 
change, energy technologies, advanced manufacturing, ecosystems and the 
economy, antibiotic resistance, drug discovery and development, 
semiconductors, hearing aids, pandemic flu vaccines, health information 
technology, STEM education, agriculture, and big data and privacy.17 
PCAST’s report on forensic science, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts:  
Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods, was released 
in September 2016.18  The unanimous report was the result of a year-long 
study, during which PCAST reviewed 2100 scientific papers, as well as 
hundreds of pages of input invited from the forensic-science community.  
Forensic-science experts and others at the FBI and NIST provided valuable 
and detailed assistance, including carefully reviewing multiple drafts of the 
report.  PCAST also constituted a panel of senior advisors, which included 
ten current or former judges, a former U.S. Solicitor General, two law-school 
deans, and two statisticians.19  As with all PCAST reports, the conclusions 
represent those of the presidential science advisors.  The complete report 
included a 174-page main text, a 131-page appendix containing responses to 
PCAST’s request for public input in 2015, a 98-page appendix listing the 
scientific papers consulted, and a 9-page addendum approved on January 6, 
2017.20 
Agreeing with the NRC’s assessment that many forensic methods had long 
been used in courts despite the lack of meaningful evidence of scientific 
validity, PCAST focused considerable attention on the issue of the 
admissibility of forensic testimony under Rule 702.  The report outlined the 
scientific meaning of “reliability” and “scientific validity” for a key class of 
forensic methods—including how these concepts specifically relate to 702(c) 
 
 16. Celebrating the Contributions of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 9, 2017, 2:30 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
blog/2017/01/09/celebrating-contributions-presidents-council-advisors-science-and-
technology [https://perma.cc/W4BZ-3B4P]. 
 17. PCAST Documents & Reports, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
administration/eop/ostp/pcast/docsreports [https://perma.cc/P8YV-KVYX] (last visited Feb. 
14, 2018). 
 18. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8. 
 19. Id. at viii–ix. 
 20. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8. 
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and 702(d), which PCAST referred to respectively as “foundational validity” 
and “validity as applied.” 
The report made eight recommendations to the federal government, 
including both the executive and judicial branches.  Among these, PCAST 
recommended that the Judicial Conference of the United States, through its 
Standing Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, should provide guidance 
to the federal courts about the standards for admissibility under Rule 702 of 
expert testimony on certain forensic-science methods, through a new 
Advisory Committee note and a best-practices manual.21 
In response to PCAST’s recommendation, the Standing Advisory 
Committee on Evidence Rules convened a meeting on forensic expert 
testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702 on October 27, 2017, at Boston College 
Law School to inform itself about the issues.22  The meeting included 
presentations by twenty-six speakers (including myself) and discussion 
among the attendees. 
The purpose of this Article is to summarize aspects of the PCAST report 
relevant to its recommendation to the Standing Advisory Committee on 
Evidence Rules and to propose a path forward with respect to Rule 702. 
I.  FORENSIC FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 
The PCAST report focused on a specific class of forensic methods, termed 
“forensic feature-comparison methods.”23  The category includes the analysis 
of DNA, hair, latent fingerprints, firearms and spent ammunition, toolmarks, 
shoe prints and tire tracks, bite marks, and handwriting.24  In each method, 
examiners compare distinctive features (e.g., DNA fragment sizes, 
impressions, and so on) in two samples (e.g., from a crime scene and suspect) 
to determine whether they are likely to come from the same source.25  Some 
of the methods are fully objective, while others involve examiners making 
subjective judgments.26 
PCAST chose to focus on these methods for several reasons:  the methods 
are widely used in criminal forensics, practitioners have historically claimed 
them to be highly accurate, the lay public largely regards them as highly 
accurate, wrongful convictions have occurred in cases involving this class of 
methods, and the methods all involve metrology—the science of 
measurement and comparison—which is a discipline with well-defined 
scientific standards.27  In short, it is both important and feasible to ensure that 
these methods are reliable. 
 
 21. Id. at 145. 
 22. See generally ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF EVIDENCE OCTOBER 2017 AGENDA 
BOOK (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/a3_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6FB-
APZB]; Daniel J. Capra, Foreword:  Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and 
Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1459 (2018). 
 23. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 44. 
 24. Id. at 23. 
 25. Id. at 146. 
 26. Id. at 47. 
 27. Id. at 44–46. 
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Forensic feature-comparison methods all involve answering two 
fundamental questions: 
(1) Do two samples match?  More precisely, are their features within 
a given degree of similarity? 
(2) How meaningful is the match?  More precisely, what is the 
probability that two samples from different sources would show 
features with the same degree of similarity? 
Both questions must be answered before one can draw a conclusion about 
the likely origin of a sample.  The finding of a match between two samples 
cannot be interpreted—in fact, it is meaningless—unless one knows how 
often unrelated samples show the observed degree of match.  It is obviously 
crucial to know whether a method produces false-positive matches at a rate 
of 1 in 5000 or 1 in 5. 
U.S. District Judge John Potter nicely expressed this point in his opinion 
in United States v. Yee,28 an early case on the use of DNA analysis:  “Without 
the probability assessment, the jury does not know what to make of the fact 
that the patterns match:  the jury does not know whether the patterns are as 
common as pictures with two eyes, or as unique as the Mona Lisa.”29 
II.  SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FORENSIC 
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 
According to Rule 702 and Daubert, courts must consider a key question:  
What does it mean for a forensic feature-comparison method to be 
scientifically valid? 
The basic answer is simple:  scientific validity requires empirical evidence 
of how well a method works in practice.  This is nothing more than a 
restatement of the foundational principle of science established 400 years 
ago—namely, that assertions about the world cannot be accepted based on 
authority but must be subjected to empirical testing. 
The PCAST report emphasized that direct empirical testing was the only 
way to establish the scientific validity of a forensic feature-comparison 
method—that nothing else could substitute for it.30  The report laid out for 
courts the two essential elements31: 
(1) Reproducible procedure.  The method must have a well-defined, 
reproducible procedure for identifying and comparing the 
features in two samples and for determining whether they share 
sufficient similarity (often called a matching rule).  Without this, 
one does not even have a method to test. 
(2) Estimation of false-positive rate.  The method must be 
empirically tested, under conditions appropriate to the intended 
 
 28. 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 
(6th Cir. 1993). 
 29. Id. at 181. 
 30. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 47. 
 31. Id. at 48. 
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use, to determine its accuracy (i.e., how often samples from 
different sources are erroneously declared to match), which must 
be suitable for the intended use.  Without this, the results cannot 
be interpreted. 
PCAST noted that scientific validity does not require that a method be 
perfect.32  But, it does require knowing the chances of falsely declaring a 
match between samples from different sources (e.g., 1 in 1 million, 1 in 600, 
1 in 50, or 1 in 3).33 
Feature-comparison methods can be classified as objective or subjective 
depending on whether they involved significant human judgment.34  
Subjective methods require special scrutiny because they effectively involve 
a “black box” in each examiner’s head.35  To assess their accuracy, one must 
therefore conduct so-called “black-box studies” in which one presents 
examiners with samples from the same or different sources and records how 
often examiners give the correct answer.36  As discussed below, the FBI 
laboratory has done pioneering work using black-box studies to assess the 
reliability of latent fingerprint analysis.37 
The PCAST report noted six scientifically self-evident criteria for any 
scientifically valid study to assess the accuracy of a method.  Specifically, (1) 
the study should employ samples that are representative of the intended 
application and numerous enough to provide a meaningful estimate of 
accuracy, (2) examiners should not know the correct answers in advance nor 
should the study design allow them to make inferences about the correct 
answers, (3) the criteria for evaluating the study (especially what constitutes 
an error) should be specified in advance, not after seeing the results, (4) the 
study should be conducted or overseen by scientists with no stake in the 
outcome, (5) the results should be available for review by other scientists, 
and (6) the conclusions should be reproduced by a second group.38 
Strikingly, PCAST’s report produced diametrically opposed reactions.  To 
scientists, the discussion of scientific validity seemed obvious.  By contrast, 
many forensic practitioners and prosecutors objected to the idea that 
empirical testing was an absolute requirement.  Instead, they insisted, 
forensic methods could be considered “reliable” even without direct 
empirical testing to assess their accuracy.  To grasp this response, it is 
necessary to understand the history of forensic science. 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 47. 
 35. Id. at 49. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.  Once the accuracy of a method has 
been established, one can also use “white-box studies” to try to shed light on factors that affect 
examiners’ accuracy.  Although not necessary for admissibility, such studies can be valuable 
for improving a method.  For a brief description of a white-box study the FBI has conducted, 
see PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 99–100. 
 38. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 52–53. 
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III.  THE LONG AND UNFINISHED PATH 
FROM FORENSICS TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 
Forensic feature-comparison methods (with the notable exception of DNA 
analysis) did not emerge from scientific laboratories but rather were 
developed by police departments as rough-and-ready tools to aid in criminal 
investigations.39  As a result, practitioners of these methods devoted much 
effort to practical issues, such as characterizing features and refining 
laboratory techniques, but paid virtually no attention to the foundational issue 
of accuracy.40 
PCAST surveyed the troubling history for five non-DNA-based feature-
comparison disciplines:  latent fingerprints, firearms, hair, bite marks, and 
footwear.41  In each case, the disciplines were admitted in court based on 
extraordinary claims unsupported by empirical evidence.  Only slowly are 
these claims being subjected to empirical testing—revealing that they were 
grossly inaccurate, often by many orders of magnitude.42 
The history might be characterized as having three successive stages:  (1) 
data-free theories, (2) spurious estimates, and (3) meaningful empirical 
testing.  We discuss these stages in turn, with an overview provided in Table 
1. 
A.  Stage 1:  Data-Free Theories 
In this stage, various types of arguments are made about why a method 
should, in principle, be extremely accurate—without actually testing the 
method empirically.  Much attention, for example, has been devoted to 
“uniqueness studies” aimed at proving that no two objects give identical 
patterns (e.g., fingerprints, shoe prints), with the implication that feature-
comparison analysis will thus never yield false positives.  For example, in a 
2012 paper on shoe prints, the author studied thirty-nine Adidas Supernova 
Classic size-twelve running shoes worn by a single runner over eight years, 
by applying black shoe polish to the soles and having the owner carefully 
produce tread marks by walking on sheets of legal paper on a hardwood floor.  
The author reported that small identifying differences could be found 
between different pairs of shoes.43 
The PCAST report noted that:  
uniqueness studies miss the fundamental point.  The issue is not whether 
objects or features differ; they surely do if one looks at a fine enough level.  
The issue is how well and under what circumstances examiners applying a 
 
 39. Id. at 32. 
 40. See id. at 32–33. 
 41. Id. at 83–122. 
 42. See id. at 76 (describing an instance where the prosecutor told the jury that the chance 
of a false positive was 1 in 1 billion when the actual probability could have been as low as 1 
in 2); see also infra tbl.1. 
 43. See id. at 62 (citing Hilary D. Wilson, Comparison of the Individual Characteristics 
in the Outsoles of Thirty-Nine Pairs of Adidas Supernova Classic Shoes, 62 J. FORENSIC 
IDENTIFICATION 194 (2012)). 
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given metrological method can reliably detect relevant differences in 
features to reliably identify whether they share a common source.  
Uniqueness studies, which focus on the properties of features themselves, 
can therefore never establish whether a particular method for measuring 
and comparing features is foundationally valid.  Only empirical studies can 
do so.44 
Another popular approach has been to invoke mathematical calculations.  
In such studies, authors consider various types of features that might make 
up a pattern and calculate the number of patterns that might theoretically 
arise.  Given enough features assumed to occur independently and be 
detected perfectly, the potential number of patterns is guaranteed to be 
astronomical.  A widely cited 1984 paper measured twelve parameters in 
roughly 400 bite marks carefully made in wax wafers and calculated that the 
chance that two different sources would produce matching bite marks is less 
than one in six trillion.45  The paper was entirely theoretical:  it did not even 
undertake any actual comparisons.46  Similarly, a 2006 paper on footwear 
examination, cited by the FBI, used a mathematical model to assert that the 
chance that two shoe prints from different sources would share three 
characteristics was less than 1 in 683 billion.47  Again, the study analyzed no 
actual shoe prints.48 
A third solution was simply to declare that methods are perfect.  The DOJ 
took this approach in its 1984 publication The Science of Fingerprints, which 
asserted that, “Of all the methods of identification, fingerprinting alone has 
proved to be both infallible and feasible.”49  At the time, no empirical studies 
of accuracy had been undertaken.50  The DOJ conceded in a 2016 draft 
guidance document about appropriate language for testimony and reports that 
this earlier assertion was unjustified.51 
The Association of Firearms and Tool Mark Examiners (AFTE) provides 
an example of data-free circular reasoning in its Theory of Identification as 
It Relates to Toolmarks.52  The “theory” (1) declares that an examiner is 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 84.  See 
generally Raymond D. Rawson et al., Statistical Evidence for the Individuality of the Human 
Dentition, 29 J. FORENSIC SCI. 245 (1984). 
 46. See generally Rawson et al., supra note 45.  As discussed below, recent empirical 
studies of bite-mark examiners have found stunningly high error rates. 
 47. See generally Rocky S. Stone, Footwear Examinations:  Mathematical Probabilities 
of Theoretical Individual Characteristics, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 577 (2006). 
 48.  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 115. 
 49. FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINTS:  CLASSIFICATION AND 
USES, at iv (1984). 
 50. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 87 (citing FBI, 
supra note 49). 
 51. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION FOR DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE PROPOSED UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS FOR THE FORENSIC 
LATENT PRINT DISCIPLINE 15 (2016)). 
 52. See generally Comm. for the Advancement of the Sci. of Firearm & Tool Mark 
Identification, Theory of Identification as It Relates to Toolmarks:  Revised, 43 AFTE J. 287 
(2011). 
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justified in concluding that two toolmarks have a common origin if they are 
in “sufficient agreement” and (2) defines “sufficient agreement” as meaning 
that the agreement between the two toolmarks is such that it is a “practical 
impossibility” that they have different origins.53  AFTE still contends that its 
document constitutes a meaningful scientific theory. 
From a scientific standpoint, such efforts to justify forensic feature-
comparison methods as scientifically valid would be amusing—except that 
the arguments were accepted by courts in criminal cases. 
B.  Stage 2:  Spurious Estimates 
In this stage, estimates of accuracy are made based on contrived situations 
that do not correspond to the method’s use in practice.  Expert testimony in 
2009 by a former head of the FBI’s fingerprint unit provides an example of 
how not to estimate accuracy from empirical data.  He told the court that the 
FBI’s latent fingerprint analysis had “an error rate of one per every 11 million 
cases.”54  He had arrived at that estimate, he explained, because among 11 
million fingerprint identifications performed by the agency, he was aware of 
only one error.55 
In a classic study of microscopic hair analysis in the 1970s (and quoted 
approvingly by the DOJ in 2016), all pairwise comparisons were performed 
between hairs from different sources and showed a remarkably low false-
positive rate of 1 in 40,000.56  Unfortunately, the result is meaningless 
because the examiner knew that every comparison involved hairs from 
different sources!57  With no risk of missing true matches, they could safely 
focus on finding differences—whether real or imagined.58  As noted below, 
a rigorous evaluation of hair analysis found a dramatically higher false-
positive rate.59 
Finally, firearms analysis presents a subtler issue.  Starting about two 
decades ago, forensic scientists undertook studies in which they presented 
examiners with samples of spent ammunition and asked them to identify a 
match within a set of samples fired from a collection of known guns.60  The 
examiners performed well, with a false-positive rate of roughly 1 in 5000.61  
However, these studies had serious flaws.  In contrast to casework, many 
involved “closed set” comparisons, where examiners knew or could infer that 
 
 53. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 59 (citing 
Comm. for the Advancement of the Sci. of Firearm & Toolmark Identification, supra note 52). 
 54. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 990–91 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 55. Id. at 989. 
 56. B.D. Gaudette & E.S. Keeping, An Attempt at Determining Probabilities in Human 
Scalp Hair Comparisons, 19 J. FORENSIC SCI. 599, 599 (1974); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 
OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 28. 
 57. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 118–19 (citing 
Gaudette & Keeping, supra note 56). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 60. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 106–09. 
 61. Id. at 111. 
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a correct answer was always present in the known set.62  Such knowledge 
provides a big leg up:  examiners can safely match an unknown sample to the 
closest matching known (rather than worrying that there may not be a 
match).63  In some studies, they could use results from some samples to 
narrow the options for other samples.64  The Director of the Defense Forensic 
Science Center analogized such studies to solving a “Sudoku” puzzle, where 
initial answers can be used to help fill in subsequent answers.65 
In fairness, the scientists who designed the studies likely did not recognize 
the problem.  However, recent studies that employed “open-set” designs 
(where examiners have no ancillary information bearing on whether any pair 
of samples matches) have yielded error rates closer to 1 in 50—that is, one 
hundredfold higher than the earlier closed-set designs.66  PCAST rejected the 
earlier studies as providing overly optimistic estimates of accuracy.67 
C.  Stage 3:  Meaningful Empirical Testing 
In this final stage, forensic scientists obtain a scientifically valid measure 
of accuracy by conducting black-box studies that directly measure 
examiners’ accuracy in a setting that resembles the method’s use in practice 
but in which the evaluators know the right answers.  Notably, the first black-
box studies for subjective feature-comparison methods were only undertaken 
after the NRC report called attention to the lack of evidence for scientific 
validity for most forensic methods.68 
The first properly designed black-box study on latent fingerprint analysis 
was reported in 2011.69  In a paper by FBI scientists and their collaborators 
published in the prestigious journal Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, they asked each of 169 examiners to analyze 100 pairs of 
fingerprints.70  The paper found a false identification rate of roughly 1 in 600 
(with a confidence interval ranging up to 1 in 300).71  A subsequent black-
box study conducted by the Miami-Dade Police Department Forensic 
Services Bureau, with funding from the National Institute of Justice, found a 
higher error rate of 1 in 137 (if one excludes false positives that the authors 
suggest are likely to represent clerical errors) or 1 in 24 (if one includes these 
errors, as one would in a clinical trial).72  These error rates are a far cry from 
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the DOJ’s original claim of infallibility, but they are perfectly serviceable 
estimates of reliability that would allow a jury to weigh fingerprint testimony 
relative to other evidence in a criminal case. 
The first black-box study of firearms analysis was reported by the Ames 
Laboratory in 2014; the work was stimulated and funded by the Defense 
Forensic Science Center, whose director had criticized the Sudoku-like 
nature of previous closed-set studies.73  Similar in its basic design to the 
FBI’s latent-fingerprint study, the authors evaluated the performance of 218 
examiners on fifteen separate comparison problems.74  They reported an error 
rate of 1 in 66 (with a confidence interval ranging to 1 in 46).75  As noted 
above, the error rate is approximately one hundredfold higher than the closed-
set studies.76  With only a single well-designed study estimating accuracy, 
PCAST judged that firearms analysis fell just short of the criteria for 
scientific validity, which requires reproducibility.77  A second study would 
solve this problem. 
Although black-box studies have not yet been conducted for other 
disciplines, PCAST summarized the limited scientific studies undertaken for 
hair and bite-mark analysis.78  The papers are notable because they debunk 
past claims about the accuracy of these disciplines. 
A 2002 paper by FBI scientists revealed a stunningly high false-
identification rate for hair analysis.79  The study did not present examiners 
with test problems but rather used DNA analysis to reexamine hair samples 
from actual criminal cases that FBI examiners had declared were 
microscopically indistinguishable.80  In contrast to earlier work claiming that 
hairs from different sources could be distinguished with an error rate of only 
1 in 40,000 comparisons, DNA analysis of casework revealed that 11 percent 
of hairs (that is, 1 in 9) reported as microscopically indistinguishable actually 
came from different sources.81 
Only a few small empirical studies have been reported on the accuracy of 
bite-mark examiners.  The results have been consistently appalling.  In a 2010 
paper, for example, twenty-nine examiners were asked to inspect 
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photographs of bite marks (produced in pig flesh by a mechanical biting 
machine using human dentition) and decide whether they came from 
individuals A, B, C, or none of the above.82  When the correct answer was 
“none of the above,” the examiners nonetheless attributed the bite marks to 
one of the three known sources for 17 percent of samples (that is, 1 in 6).83  
Other studies showed that bite-mark examiners performed poorly even in a 
closed-set design, when the correct source was always provided (error rates 
of 1 in 9).84 
 Finally, PCAST could find few relevant papers on footwear analysis and 
none that even came close to providing a serious evaluation of scientific 
validity.85 
D.  Current Status of Forensic Methods 
In summary, there has been some progress since the NRC’s report in 2009.  
Empirical studies have now provided scientifically valid estimates of the 
accuracy of latent fingerprint analysis, and firearms analysis is coming close 
to achieving the standard for scientific validity.  With respect to hair analysis, 
little has been done to address the poor ability to distinguish different-source 
samples in casework revealed by the FBI’s study.  At the least, juries should 
be told that 1 in 9 identifications in casework proved to come from different 
sources.  As for bite-mark analysis, the field does not appear to be 
salvageable; it should be abandoned.  Finally, footwear analysis has yet to be 
subjected to empirical testing—although it continues to be used in court. 
In light of the historical (and in some cases continuing) lack of empirical 
evidence, what has given forensic practitioners confidence that their methods 
were reliable?  The answer is that they have had faith in their processes.  
Specifically, they point to (1) examiners’ extensive “experience” and 
“judgment” in the course of casework and (2) good professional practices, 
such as the existence of professional societies, certification programs, peer-
reviewed articles, proficiency testing, and codes of ethics. 
There is a gaping hole in this logic.  Extensive experience and good 
professional practices are clearly important, and forensic practitioners should 
be commended for their attention to these matters.  But, experience and 
professional practices can never establish whether a method itself is 
reliable—for the simple reason that neither assesses a method’s accuracy.  
Experience in casework provides no information about accuracy because the 
right answer is not known in casework.  And, professional practices concern 
process not results. 
To grasp the importance of this point, one need only note that practitioners 
of pseudoscience—such as psychics—can make the same claims about their 
fields.  Psychics can claim extensive experience in mindreading and 
soothsaying, and they too have professional societies, certification programs, 
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peer-reviewed journals, proficiency testing, and codes of ethics.  Despite 
these trappings of science, psychics’ claims are not accepted as scientifically 
valid—and are not admissible under Rule 702—because their methods have 
not withstood appropriate empirical testing to determine their accuracy. 
For forensic methods to be accepted as reliable and scientifically valid, 
there is simply no substitute for actual empirical testing of accuracy. 
IV.  THE DOJ’S RESISTANCE TO ADDRESSING THE  
ISSUES OF SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY 
For its part, the DOJ has resisted the necessity of empirical testing.  The 
resistance is understandable:  acknowledging the need for empirical testing 
might lead to calls to revisit past convictions or jeopardize ongoing cases 
involving evidence based on forensic-science methods that had not been 
empirically shown to be reliable.  The DOJ has thus sought to block or blunt 
recommendations from the scientific community. 
When the NRC recommended the creation of a federal office separate from 
law enforcement to ensure the quality of forensic science,86 the DOJ 
successfully lobbied for a weaker solution:  an outside advisory committee 
that would make recommendations to the Attorney General.  The National 
Commission on Forensic Sciences was established in 2013 but soon ran into 
trouble when the DOJ’s efforts to limit the body’s scope caused a federal 
judge who served on the commission to resign in protest.87  The DOJ reversed 
course, and the commissioner returned.88  The Commission made various 
recommendations, but only a few were implemented by the Attorney 
General. 
When PCAST briefed the DOJ on its preliminary conclusions at a meeting 
that I attended in late May 2016, DOJ officials acknowledged the lack of 
empirical studies establishing reliability for some disciplines but expressed 
concerns that the report could affect past convictions and ongoing cases.  The 
DOJ proposed that PCAST delay its report until December 2016 and declare 
that its findings should not be applied retroactively.  
While understanding the reasons for the DOJ’s concern, PCAST declined 
these suggestions.  In particular, it saw no scientific basis for distinguishing 
between past and present applications of forensic science.  However, 
consistent with its past practices, PCAST invited the DOJ to provide 
comments on the draft report and identify any relevant material that PCAST 
might have missed.  PCAST revised the report in response to several rounds 
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of comments from the DOJ, including many helpful suggestions from the FBI 
laboratory. 
In the end, however, the DOJ insisted, in written communications with 
PCAST, that the implications for Rule 702 should be deleted from the report.  
In its judgment, the President’s science advisory council had no business 
opining on the meaning of scientific validity as it pertains to the admissibility 
of expert scientific testimony.  Moreover, the DOJ asserted, the references in 
Daubert to evidentiary reliability being based on scientific validity were 
merely dicta.  The DOJ asked the White House to block the release of the 
PCAST report, but the White House declined to do so. 
When PCAST released its report on September 20, the Attorney General 
thanked PCAST for its work but stated that the agency would not accept the 
council’s recommendations.89  The statement also claimed PCAST had failed 
to mention “numerous published research studies” and that this “omission 
discredits the PCAST report as a thorough evaluation of scientific validity.”90  
In response to a request from PCAST to identify relevant omissions, the DOJ 
eventually concluded in December 2016 that it could find none.91 
Following the presidential transition in January 2017, the Attorney General 
decided to terminate the NCFS by allowing its charter to expire in April 
2017.92  The DOJ instead chose to rely solely on its own internal Senior 
Advisor on Forensics.93  Whereas the previous incumbent had been a forensic 
scientist, the DOJ in August 2017 tapped as its new advisor a prosecutor 
without scientific training who had served as a law enforcement 
representative on the NCFS.94  The new advisor has employed tactics often 
used to resist scientific consensus, such as characterizing basic scientific 
statements as extreme and alleging substantial disagreement within the 
scientific community.  For example, at the symposium organized by the 
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Standing Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, the DOJ took the position 
that (1) PCAST’s list of criteria for reliability studies was a radical 
“nonseverable six-part test” (without actually identifying any criteria that 
were not correct)95 and (2) a recent report by the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) supposedly held that empirical testing, 
as described in the PCAST report, was not the only way to establish the 
reliability of forensic feature-comparison methods.96  The AAAS swiftly 
rejected the claim, issuing a statement that the PCAST and AAAS reports 
were in complete agreement on the issue.97  In summary, it is not realistic to 
count on law enforcement to drive progress. 
V.  FIXING RULE 702 
With respect to forensic science, Rule 702 has clearly failed to accomplish 
its goal of ensuring that expert testimony must be based on reliable methods.  
Courts routinely admit testimony about feature-comparison methods that 
claim to be able to identify the source of a sample with high accuracy—even 
when the reliability of the methods have never been tested or when the 
methods have been tested and found to be unreliable. 
The leading scientific advisory groups chartered by the legislative and 
executive branches—the National Academy of Sciences and the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology—have now weighed in.  
They have unanimously agreed that methods have historically lacked 
meaningful scientific validation, that their accuracy has been seriously 
overstated, and that their misuse has led to wrongful convictions.  Moreover, 
they agree that requiring empirical testing is feasible and would increase the 
quality of forensic science—with benefits for prosecutors, defendants, and 
the public. 
To fix Rule 702, it is important to understand some reasons for its failure.  
First, many judges simply do not know how to apply the concepts of 
reliability and scientific validity to any given scientific discipline.  In the 
absence of a clear definition, they are often willing to accept the trappings of 
reliability (examiners’ experience and professional practices) rather than 
insist on actual reliability.  Second, many judges are also reluctant to 
challenge longstanding precedents concerning the admissibility of forensic 
methods, even when they were established long before current problems 
became apparent. 
How, then, to restore the role of courts, articulated in Daubert, as 
gatekeepers ensuring quality control?  The appellate process is not well suited 
to the task.  Even if an appeals court wished to do so, it would be hampered 
by the high standard (abuse of discretion) for overturning admissibility 
decisions.  And, because the vast majority of criminal cases occur in the state 
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courts, establishing a coherent jurisprudence would require parallel progress 
on the many cognate versions of Rule 702. 
Instead, PCAST recommended that the most effective solution would be 
for the Judicial Conference of the United States to clarify the meaning of 
“reliable methods” for forensic feature-comparison methods.  PCAST 
proposed that the Standing Advisory Committee on Evidence issue a new 
advisory committee note and a best-practices manual to provide clear 
guidance for courts.  Alternatively or additionally, the committee could 
propose a revision to the Federal Rules of Evidence.98 
Whatever the mechanism, the key message should be roughly the 
following: 
An expert witness may provide testimony based on a forensic examination 
conducted to determine whether an evidentiary sample is similar or 
identical to a source sample if (in addition to satisfying existing 
requirements under Rule 702): 
(i) the witness’s method is sufficiently repeatable, reproducible, and 
accurate for its intended use, as shown by empirical studies conducted 
under conditions appropriate to the intended use; 
(ii) the witness is capable of applying the method reliably and actually 
did so; and 
(iii) the witness accurately states the probative value of the meaning of 
any similarity or match between the samples. 
With respect to the third point, it is useful to give a specific example of 
appropriate testimony.  Suppose that two proper black-box studies have been 
performed and published.  The data in each study allows empirical estimates 
to be made of a method’s error rate.  Courts should require a witness to 
describe in clear and simple terms what is known about accuracy and error 
rate based on these studies.  An appropriate statement would be: 
Examiners sometimes make mistakes in associating a sample with a 
particular individual.  Studies have therefore been done to see 
approximately how often such errors occur in situations similar to this one.  
In one study, examiners made false associations at a rate of 1 in every 300 
comparisons performed.  Given the number of tests carried out, the true 
error rate in this study might be somewhat higher—possibly 1 in 150.  In a 
second study, examiners made false associations at a rate of 1 in every 75 
comparisons; given the number of tests carried out, the true error rate in 
this study might be 1 in 40.  In short, the method usually gives the correct 
answer, but errors do occur. 
One might be tempted to try to craft a general rule that would provide 
guidance not just for forensic feature-comparison methods, but for all 
forensic-science testimony in criminal cases.  But, such a course would be 
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problematic.  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes cautioned, “the life of the 
law . . . is experience.”99 
We now have two decades of experience illuminating the problems and 
solutions for forensic feature-comparison methods.  When adequate 
experience arises for other areas, they may be addressed in turn.  It may not 
be necessary to repeat this exercise many times.  Even a few examples may 
suffice to signal to courts that they should engage more generally in the 


































 99. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
2018] FIXING RULE 702 1679 
Table 1:  Summary of Claims About the Accuracy 
of Forensic Feature-Comparison Methods 
 
Method 
Stage 1:  
Data-Free 
Theories 
Stage 2:  
Spurious 
Estimates 




Fingerprints “Infallible” 1 in 11 
million
1 in 600 
Firearms n/a 1 in 5000 1 in 50 
Hair Analysis n/a 1 in 40,000 1 in 9100 
Bite marks 1 in 6 trillion n/a 1 in 6101 
Footwear 1 in 683 billion n/a None 
 
 
 100. Well-designed black-box studies have not been performed for this discipline, but other 
studies showed extremely high error rates. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 101. Well-designed black-box studies have not been performed for this discipline, but other 
studies showed extremely high error rates. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
